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1. Introduction 
In the United States, the concentration of college graduates in the population varies 
widely by state.  In 2000, the percentage of adults aged 25 and older with a bachelor’s degree or 
higher varied from 14.8 percent in West Virginia to 33.2 percent in Massachusetts and 39.1 
percent in the District of Columbia.  As shown in Figure 1, this percentage was lowest in several 
Appalachian states and in the South Central region of the country.  The percentage was highest 
in several states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions and in Colorado. 
Cross-state differences in the percentage of state residents with a college degree are quite 
stable over time.  For example, although each state experienced an increase in this percentage 
from 1990 to 2000 (the cross-state average increased from 20.0 percent to 24.1 percent), the 
correlation across states between the percentages in 1990 and 2000 is 0.99.  Over many decades 
the pattern is not constant but still quite persistent; for example, the correlation between the 
percentages in 1950 and 2000 is 0.76 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006).  Furthermore, the extent 
of variation across states in the concentration of college graduates was roughly constant between 
1934 and 2004 (Bauer, Schweitzer, and Shane 2008). 
Policymakers in many states seek to increase the percentage of their state’s population 
with college degrees.  The motivation for this goal is the documented relationship between 
knowledge stocks and the economic vitality of states, cities, and regions.  Evidence from cities 
suggests that raising the overall education level of an area increases the wages of all workers in 
the area (Moretti 2004) and contributes to economic growth (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 
1995).  Evidence from states indicates that the share of the workforce with a college degree is a 
key factor in the state’s productivity (Iranzo and Peri 2009) and relative per-capita personal 
income (Bauer et al. 2008).  Moreover, college graduates earn more and therefore pay more in 
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state taxes.  On the flip side of government budgets, college graduates are less likely to receive 
public assistance (welfare and Medicaid), have lower costs for employment-related programs 
(unemployment insurance and worker’s compensation), and are less likely to be imprisoned 
(Trostel and Gabe 2007). 
Higher education in the United States in financed to a large extent through state 
governments.  Public colleges and universities account for about 65 percent of all bachelor’s 
degrees awarded (National Center for Education Statistics 2008).  Given the large role of states 
and the economic benefits to knowledge stocks, many states try to use higher-education policies 
to increase the percentage of their state’s population (or workforce) that has a college education.  
However, given the mobility of the labor force in general (Long 1988; Bartik 1991; Blanchard 
and Katz 1992) and of college-educated labor in particular (Long 1988; Bound and Holzer 2000; 
Wozniak 2006), a policy change in a given state may not necessarily affect the number of college 
graduates living in the state. 
This article reviews the effectiveness of state higher-education policies at influencing the 
supply of college-educated labor within a state.  Although in practice states use both demand-
side and supply-side policies to promote economic development (Bartik 1991), my focus in this 
article is on the supply side.  At issue is the relative effectiveness of supply-side and demand-
side policies in affecting the location choice of college-educated workers.  I discuss policy 
options that have been implemented (or proposed) and highlight research that is relevant to 
evaluating these policies.  My focus is on policies at the undergraduate level; in practice, state 
policies also affect the production of advanced degrees (e.g., master’s degrees and doctorates) 
and sub-baccalaureate degrees (e.g., associates degrees). 
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The next section of the paper presents a conceptual model of the supply and demand for 
college-educated labor in a state.  The subsequent sections discuss various types of policies 
related to the finance and production of undergraduate education in a state.  Section 3 discusses 
expansions in the number of degrees awarded by institutions in the state.  Section 4 discusses 
merit-based scholarships, an increasingly popular form of student financial aid.  Section 5 
discusses location-contingent financial aid, which directly links retention with recruitment.  
Section 6 considers adjustments to the composition of enrollment by residency or by field of 
study.  Section 7 discusses other retention and recruitment programs.  I offer some concluding 
thoughts in the final section of the review. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Students graduating from high school face a sequence of choices regarding their 
education and employment.1  First is the decision of whether to go to college or to enter the 
workforce.  Among those who attend college, the second choice is which college to attend.  
Students make these choices based on their aptitude for academic study, the educational 
opportunities and costs at various colleges, and the proximity of these colleges to family and 
friends.  Once enrolled in college, students choose a major field of study, how much effort to 
apply to their studies, and how to finance their college costs.  Students who complete a college 
degree must decide which occupation to enter and where to work.  These choices are shaped by 
the wages and employment opportunities in the occupations for which their major prepares them.  
These opportunities often vary across space and therefore geographic considerations play a large 
role in graduates’ employment choices. 
                                                          
1 For a review of empirical research on the role of various public policies on college enrollment rates, persistence in 
college, and college graduation rates, see Ehrenberg (2004). 
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A simple conceptual model helps to organize thoughts about the effects of various 
policies.  The model presented in this section places state-level degree outputs in the context of 
demand and supply in the labor market.  The model, which is based on Bound, Groen, Kezdi, 
and Turner (2004), is appropriate to the U.S. context because any given state is an open 
economy: workers can move freely into and out of the state depending on economic 
opportunities in the state and in other states.  Firms are also mobile across state borders.  At issue 
is the extent to which employers’ location choices are motivated by the educational attainment of 
the workforce in different states (i.e., employers move to workers) or workers move to jobs.   
The model is shown graphically in Figure 2, with the horizontal axis indicating the 
quantity of college-educated labor relative to high school-educated labor within the state and the 
vertical axis indicating relative wages for college-educated labor within the state.  The F curve 
represents the relative flow of college-educated labor arising from the production of bachelor’s 
degrees within the state.  Without post-college migration, this would be the supply of college-
educated labor relative to supply of high school-educated labor in the state.  The S curve 
incorporates migration.  Under infinitely elastic migration, S would be horizontal at the national 
wage ratio.  The figure represents the case of imperfect but nonzero mobility, which is shown by 
the S curve being more elastic than the F curve.  The two curves cross at the relative wage level 
for which there is no net migration.  For wages above this point there is net in-migration of 
college-educated labor and S lies to the right of F; for wages below this level there is net out-
migration of college-educated labor and S lies to the left of F. 
The D curve represents the relative long-run demand schedule for college-educated labor 
within the state.  Shifts in the relative supply of college-educated labor in a state (the S curve) 
lead to adjustments in production, with shifts toward industries and technologies intensive in 
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college-educated workers when this factor is relatively plentiful (movements along the D curve).  
In this way, changes in output mix are one way that state labor markets can adjust to supply 
shifts (Hanson and Slaughter 2002).  The elasticity of demand is tied to the mix of traded and 
non-traded goods produced in the state.  For workers (e.g., engineers) employed in the 
production of goods and services that are traded across state boundaries, the within-state demand 
curve is likely to be relatively flat, because there is more room for the reallocation of labor across 
sectors.  By contrast, the demand curve is likely to be relatively steep for types of skilled labor 
employed in the production of goods and services that are not traded across state boundaries but 
instead produced and consumed locally (e.g., teachers). 
Point A in Figure 2 represents equilibrium in the state labor market.  In the case 
represented, the state is a net importer of college-educated labor: equilibrium stocks are greater 
than flows.  In practice, some states are net exporters and others are net importers.  This 
distinction is likely driven by variation across states in degree flows and in the demand for 
college-educated labor.  Variation in degree flows across states may occur because some states 
have a comparative advantage in the production of higher education, with differences derived 
from historical forces affecting where colleges were located more than a century ago, proximity 
to population centers, or willingness of voters to support higher education.   
Variation across states in demand for college-educated labor may occur because some 
states have a comparative advantage in the production of goods and services intensive in college-
educated labor.  This type of comparative advantage might arise from the pattern of settlement of 
the country, the initial location of particular industries, and the pattern of resource endowments 
and climate.  Examples might include the nation’s political capital (Washington, D.C.) and its 
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suburbs in Maryland and Virginia, and the nation’s financial capital (New York City) and its 
suburbs in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. 
Each of the policies discussed in this review seeks to increase the relative quantity of 
college-education labor in a state by shifting the supply curve.  A shift in the relative supply of 
college graduates in a state is represented in Figure 2 as a shift in the supply schedule from S to 
S′.  In keeping with my focus on supply-side policies, I assume that the shift in S does not 
directly affect the demand for college-educated labor.  With the shift in the supply schedule, 
equilibrium stocks increase from q to q′ and equilibrium wages for college graduates fall from w 
to w′.  For a given shift in the supply curve, the increase in the relative quantity of college-
educated labor (q to q′) depends on the elasticity of demand: the more elastic is demand, the 
greater the increase in quantity.  Note that although the shift in supply is assumed not to affect 
demand, this shift may lead to an increase in the quantity demanded. 
3. Expansions of Degree Production 
One policy option for shifting the supply curve is to increase the number of degrees 
awarded by colleges and universities in the state.  Such a change is represented graphically in 
Figure 2 by an outward shift in the F curve.  The shift in F would induce a shift in the net 
relative supply of college-educated labor (the S curve), and the equilibrium would shift along the 
demand curve from point A to a point such as point B.  In practice, a state could increase the 
relative flow of college-educated labor by increasing the number of students pursuing bachelor’s 
degrees or by increasing the share of entering students who go on to earn a bachelor’s degree 
(i.e., by reducing attrition from college). 
Bound et al. (2004) estimate the relationship between the relative flows of college 
graduates at the state level and the stock of college-educated workers in the state.  Using a formal 
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version of the model illustrated in Figure 2, they show that in response to an exogenous increase 
in flows, the ratio of the change in stocks to the change in flows is β≡[σ/(σ+θ)], which is less 
than or equal to 1.  In this expression, σ represents the elasticity of within-state relative demand 
(i.e., the elasticity of substitution between college- and high school-educated labor) and θ 
represents the migration elasticity (which determines the contrast between the F and S curves). 
This equation is useful in understanding the determinants of the effect of flows on stocks.  
The larger the elasticity of demand (σ), the larger will be the effect of changes in flows on 
changes in stocks.  For example, the effect would likely be larger for degree types employed in 
the traded-goods sector than for those employed in the production of non-traded goods.  This is 
because the traded-goods sector can sell in other states the increased output resulting from the 
increased use of college-educated labor.  By contrast, more mobility (θ) dampens the effect of 
flows on stocks.  At one extreme, no mobility (θ=0) leads to a one-to-one mapping between 
changes in flows and changes in stocks (since in this case the S and F curves are identical).  At 
the other extreme, frictionless mobility (θ=∞) leads to a zero effect of flows on stocks. 
Bound et al. (2004) estimate β separately for two degree types: bachelor’s degrees and 
medical degrees.  The elasticity of demand in state labor markets is likely to be greater for 
baccalaureate graduates than for medical doctors because baccalaureate graduates are more 
likely to be employed in the traded-goods sector.2  Consequently, employers can concentrate 
production of traded goods and services in areas where college-educated labor is relatively 
plentiful.  By contrast, medical doctors work largely in the non-traded sector, providing services 
to patients who live in a particular geographic area. 
                                                          
2 Another difference between these two types of graduates is their degree of specialization.  The general skills taught 
in college suggest that employers can mold baccalaureate graduates, whereas medical doctors are more specialized 
when they graduate. 
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The empirical results indicate a modest association between flows and stocks for 
bachelor’s degrees.  Based on data for individuals who received their degrees between 1966 and 
1985, a 10 percent increase in per-capita degree production in a state is associated with a 3.2 
percent increase in concentration of bachelor’s recipients in the state’s population.3  Thus, stocks 
and flows are related, but the relationship is appreciably less than one-for-one and points to the 
importance of migration of graduates across state boundaries. 
For medical degrees, by contrast, the cross-sectional relationship between production of 
MD degrees and the representation of doctors in the population is remarkably weak.  A 10 
percent increase in per-capita degree production is associated with an increase in concentration 
of physicians of less than 1 percent.4  The weak link between flows and stocks for medical 
degrees is consistent with an inelastic demand for medical services within states, reflecting 
employment concentrated in the non-traded sector. 
The graphical presentation of flows and stocks in Figure 3 helps to sharpen understanding 
of the regression estimates.  In each panel, the horizontal axis shows the average production of 
each type of degree for the 1966–85 degree cohorts and the vertical axis shows the average 
concentration of these degree holders in the population.  The diagonal line distinguishes net 
importers (above the line) from net exporters (below the line).  For bachelor’s degrees, net 
importers include California, Maryland, and Connecticut; on the flip side, states such as South 
Dakota, Utah, and Vermont are net exporters of baccalaureate-trained personnel.  The importing 
states have a large fraction of college graduates in their workforces even though they do not 
produce a lot of graduates.  The exporting states produce a lot of graduate but have a relatively 
small fraction of college graduates in their workforces.  The figure makes clear the positive 
                                                          
3 Bound et al. (2004), Table 2. 
4 Bound et al. (2004), Table 2. 
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association between stocks and flows for bachelor’s degrees and the complete lack of association 
for medical degrees.  The figure also demonstrates that the variation across states in the 
concentration of degree recipients is less than the variation of degree production—especially in 
the case of medical degrees. 
The modest association between stocks and flows for bachelor’s degrees suggests that the 
presence of college graduates in a state works, to some extent, to expand output in industries that 
are intensive in college-educated labor.  However, the relationship between stocks and flows is 
much less than one-for-one, which suggests that increasing the scale of a state’s higher-education 
system has a limited effect on the human-capital level of its workforce.  Therefore, although 
there are many reasons why states might invest in higher education, the geographic mobility of 
college-educated labor reduces incentives for states to make such investments (Justman and 
Thisse 1997). 
4. Scholarships to Encourage Attendance at In-State Colleges 
Historically, state subsidies to undergraduate students came in the form of below-market 
tuition rates for in-state students at public colleges and universities.  On top of that, states also 
allocated money to individual students based on their financial need.  Since the early 1990s, 
many states shifted the latter form of aid from need-based to merit-based aid.  During the 1990s a 
dozen states introduced large-scale merit-aid programs (Education Commission of the States 
2001; Dynarski 2004).   
These programs waive tuition and fees for students who achieve a minimum grade point 
average (GPA) in high school (typically 3.0) and maintain a minimum GPA in college (typically 
2.5 to 3.0).  Eligibility is restricted to those who attended high school in the state.  The programs 
usually cover attendance at any public institution in the state, and some programs allow students 
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to receive a subsidy of comparable value for attendance at a private institution in the state. 
Arkansas implemented its merit-aid program in 1991 and Georgia introduced its program in 
1993. 
These merit-aid programs are typically quite broad in application.  For example, nearly 
60 percent of students graduating from high school in Georgia qualify for its merit scholarship 
(Dynarski 2008).  In addition to the broad-based merit-aid programs, states also have smaller 
merit-aid programs that are targeted at their “best and brightest” high school graduates.  For 
example, Tennesee’s Ned McWherter Scholars Program requires students to have a high school 
GPA of at least 3.5 and to score in the top 5 percent on the ACT or SAT.  As of 2000, there were 
17 states with selective merit-aid programs (Indiana Fiscal Policy Institute 2000). My analysis 
here focuses on the case of broad-based merit aid, but many of the same considerations also 
apply to merit aid that is more narrowly targeted. 
One goal of merit-aid programs is to increase the supply of college-educated labor in a 
state.  Given that the market for higher education in the United States is regional or even national 
in scope, many academically talented students choose to attend colleges outside their home states 
(Hoxby 1997).  A perception among policymakers in many states is that talented students leave 
the state for college and do not return (Schmidt 1998).  Nationwide in 1996, 25 percent of first-
time undergraduates at four-year colleges and universities attended an institution outside their 
home state, up from 20 percent in 1975 (Groen 2004).  This percentage is higher among those 
with stronger academic backgrounds.  For example, among students who entered a set of 
selective institutions in 1976 (those in the Mellon Foundation’s College and Beyond database), 
59 percent attended an institution outside their home state (Groen 2004). 
  11
By reducing the relative price of attending in-state institutions, merit-aid programs seek 
to increase the number of talented students who attend college in their home state rather than 
other states.5  Empirical evidence from Georgia and New Mexico suggests that they do indeed 
affect college choice in this way (Dynarski 2000; Binder and Ganderton 2002; Cornwell, 
Mustard, and Sridhar 2006).  For example, Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship reduced the number of 
students leaving Georgia to attend college, and the magnitude of this reduction accounts for two-
thirds of the scholarship’s enrollment effect at four-year institutions attributable to freshmen who 
recently graduated from high school (Cornwell et al. 2006). 
Do merit-aid programs accomplish their ultimate goal of increasing the supply of college-
educated labor in a state?  Or do they simply delay the exodus of talented individuals from the 
state?  The answer depends on whether attending college in a state actually encourages students 
to work in the state after college.  After students leave college, merit-aid programs do not 
provide any direct financial incentive for graduates to remain in the state.  Instead, these 
programs can influence the location decisions of college graduates through the accumulation of 
location-specific capital, which is a generic term for factors that “tie” someone to a particular 
place (DaVanzo and Morisson 1981).  This concept includes features specific to a place that are 
more valuable to an individual in one location than in another, such as personal knowledge of an 
area, employment connections, community ties, and social networks.  For example, Georgia 
residents would likely accumulate more Georgia-specific capital from attending a college in 
Georgia than from attending a college in, say, Massachusetts. 
Groen (2004) provides indirect evidence on the effectiveness of merit-aid programs by 
estimating the impact of attending college in one’s home state on the probability of working in 
                                                          
5 A related goal of merit-aid programs is to increase the share of high-school graduates who go to college; see 
Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006) and Dynarski (2000, 2004). 
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the state after college.  Data from two samples of students who attended college in the 1970s 
contain information on students’ location during high school, the colleges they applied to and 
attended, and their state of residence 10–15 years after college.  In the context of merit-aid 
programs, the focus is on the probability of graduates residing in their home state.  The 
parameter of interest is the difference between this probability among those who attended college 
in their home state and the probability among those who attended college in another state. 
To control for differences in students’ preferences for living in their home state, which 
are manifest in both their choice of college and their choice of post-college location, Groen 
(2004) limits the sample to students who applied to at least one college in their home state and to 
at least one college outside this state.  Estimates from both datasets indicate that those who 
attended college in their home state are about 10 percentage points more likely to live in this 
state after college than are those who attended college outside their home state.  For the Mellon 
Foundation’s College and Beyond database, which covers a set of selective institutions, the 
estimated effect is 0.09 (0.48–0.39).  For the National Longitudinal Study of the High School 
Class of 1972, the estimated effect is 0.10 (0.62–0.52).6  These estimates likely overstate the 
causal effect of attending college in one’s home state because the use of applications information 
does not perfectly control for selection into colleges based on location preferences. 
The magnitude of the estimated effect is rather small, especially considering its upward 
bias.  This can be seen in the context of an example.  Suppose a merit scholarship induces 100 
additional students to attend college in their home state rather than another state.  The results 
imply that no more than 10 of them would be working in the state 10–15 years after college.  
That the translation of additional students to additional college graduates working in the state is 
much less than one-for-one suggests the importance of the migration of college graduates across 
                                                          
6 Groen (2004), Tables 4 and 5. 
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state boundaries.  This result suggests that broad-based merit-aid programs may not be a cost-
effective way for states to increase the supply of college-educated labor. 
Tornatzky, Gray, Tarant, and Zimmer (2001), however, reach the opposite conclusion.  
Using data from the National Survey of Recent College Graduates on students who received 
bachelor’s degrees in science and engineering in 1994–96 and were interviewed 1–3 years after 
college, they report estimates of the effect of attending college in one’s home state that are quite 
large.  In their data, the probability of living in the home state is 0.76 for those who attended 
college in this state and 0.23 for those who attended college in another state, which implies an 
effect of 53 percentage points.  However, this estimate likely overstates the causal effect because 
Tornatzky et al. (2001) do not control for selection into colleges based on location preferences.  
Groen (2004) shows that not controlling for location preferences leads to much larger estimated 
effects.  Their results might also differ from Groen (2004) because they measure post-college 
locations only a few years after college (when some graduates are enrolled in graduate school) 
and because their sample covers only science and engineering graduates. 
5. Location-Contingent Financial Aid 
In contrast to broad-based merit-aid programs, other state scholarship programs make a 
direct connection between receiving aid and working in the state after graduation.  These 
programs are usually smaller in scale than broad-based merit-aid programs and are targeted to 
particular fields, such as medical services, teaching, or science and technology. 
In practice there are two types of location-contingent aid.  One type provides a 
scholarship during college in exchange for a commitment to work in the state after graduation; 
students who do not fulfill the work requirement must repay the scholarship.  For example, the 
Maryland Science and Technology Scholarship provides up to $3,000 per year for use in eligible 
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academic programs at any Maryland four-year institution.  Recipients must work in Maryland 
after graduation one year for each year they receive the scholarship; those who fail to meet the 
service obligation must repay the scholarship (National Governors Association 1998). 
The second type of location-contingent aid provides subsidies not during but after 
college, in the form of repayments of student loans.  For example, the Opportunity Maine 
program provides a tax credit of up to $5,500 per year in loan-repayment assistance to anyone 
who earned a bachelor’s degree from a Maine college (public or private), stays in Maine after 
graduation, and has loan debt (beginning with loans originating in January 2008).7  Compared to 
other location-contingent aid programs, the Maine program is notable for being available to 
students regardless of their field of study. 
Location-contingent aid programs for undergraduate education are relatively new and, to 
my knowledge, have not been subject to formal evaluations.  However, some lessons can be 
gleaned from the experience with contingent aid programs in other educational settings, notably 
law school and medical school. 
Field (2009) examines a financial-aid experiment at a law school involving two 
alternative aid packages assigned by lottery to a set of admitted students.  The packages had 
equivalent monetary value, but differed in the timing of payments and debt.  One package 
required the student to take on a loan that would be repaid by the school if he worked in public-
interest law.  The other package covered tuition but required the student to reimburse the school 
if he did not work in public-interest law.  The tuition-assistance approach was much more 
effective: recipients had a higher placement rate into public-interest law and (when lottery results 
were announced prior to enrollment) were more likely to enroll in law school.  These findings 
are consistent with other evidence on “debt aversion” (Thaler 1992) and suggest that location-
                                                          
7 Based on the Opportunity Maine website (http://www.opportunitymaine.org). 
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contingent aid would be more effective when structured as tuition assistance than forgivable 
loans. 
The federal government operates several programs to encourage primary-care physicians 
and other health-care practitioners to work in underserved areas.  The most visible federal 
program is the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), which is operated by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.  There are two components to the NHSC, which 
parallel the types of location-contingent aid at the undergraduate level.  The NHSC Scholarship 
Program, established in 1972, provides a full scholarship to medical students in exchange for a 
commitment to work in an underserved area following graduation (or the completion of 
residency training).  The NHSC Loan Repayment Program, established in 1987, recruits already-
trained clinicians (physicians and related professionals) to work in underserved areas in 
exchange for annual payments against students loans.  By 1998, the NHSC had supported more 
than 42,000 clinician years of service and 15,000 scholarships (Mullan 1999).  In addition to the 
NHSC, many state governments fund programs with the objective of influencing the geographic 
distribution of the health-care workforce within their state’s borders (Pathman et al. 2000).  
Finally, some programs are funded jointly by the federal government and state governments. 
The most common of the state programs are those similar to the NHSC’s programs, in 
which financial support is provided to students and health-care practitioners in exchange for a 
period of service in underserved communities (Pathman et al. 2000).  Among state programs in 
1996, the most numerous types were loan-repayment and scholarship programs, which are 
similar to the two NHSC programs.  States also have programs to provide loans to medical 
students that are to be repaid after training, either financially or by providing service.  States also 
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have direct financial-incentive programs that are similar to loan-repayment programs except that 
funds are used to pay practitioners directly rather than to pay educational debt. 
In the context of financing undergraduate education, location-contingent aid could be a 
way for states to provide funding for college while providing incentives to reside in a state after 
college (either because loans get repaid or because scholarships do not have to be repaid).  
However, there are a number of issues that should be considered in designing these programs for 
the undergraduate context.  The discussion that follows highlights administrative costs and 
complexity, debt levels, and selection into aid programs. 
Comparing the scholarships and loan repayments, there seems to be a large difference in 
administrative costs between the two when the service requirement is not met.  Under loan 
repayment this case is simple: the state does not repay loans.  But with scholarships, the money 
has already been spent so the state would have to collect some of the scholarship; this process 
could be messy and costly.  This process is analogous to what is called “clawback” in the context 
of economic-development incentives provided by state and local governments.  Clawback 
provisions provide recourse for governments to reclaim all or part of a public subsidy when a 
firm relocates or fails to create a certain number of jobs (Ledebur and Woodward 1990; Peters 
1993). 
In the undergraduate case, service requirements would be broken in many cases because 
students failed to graduate.  This consideration is important given the large amount of attrition 
that occurs.  About 50 percent of students who enroll at a four-year college do not go on to earn a 
bachelor’s degree (National Center for Education Statistics 2002); by comparison, only about 5 
percent of entering medical students fail to complete an MD (Association of American Medical 
Colleges 2007).  To ensure clawback in the case of attrition (and other breaches of the service 
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requirement), the scholarships would need to contain complicated provisions.  This facet could 
discourage eligible students from accepting these scholarships, in light of the evidence that 
complexity in the aid process limits the take-up of student loans and grants by the target 
population (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2008). 
In addition to attrition, another difference between undergraduate education and medical 
school is the amount of debt taken on by students.  Medical students typically have greater debt 
burdens at graduation, consistent with the payment of higher tuition.8  Medical students have an 
average debt of approximately $80,000 at graduation (Association of American Medical 
Colleges 1998).  College graduates, by contrast, had lower debt levels at graduation.  Among 
1999–2000 bachelor’s degree recipients, 65 percent had borrowed and the average amount 
borrowed was $19,300 (National Center for Education Statistics 2004); thus, the average debt at 
graduation for all students was about $12,500.  As a result, the scope for loan repayments as a 
vehicle for location-specific subsidies is much less among college graduates than among MD 
recipients.  Plainly, an offer to repay loan debt would provide little incentive for college 
graduates who had no debt or small amounts of it.  By contrast, a more direct financial incentive, 
such as cash payments or income-tax deductions, would be applicable to a broader range of 
graduates.  This is consistent with a proposal in 2001 by the governor of Iowa to provide tax 
credits to graduates of Iowa colleges who settle in the state (New York Times 2001). 
Another important issue in the potential effectiveness of location-contingent aid programs 
is the composition of students who select into these programs.  Since the programs provide 
                                                          
8 For the academic year 1996–97, tuition for medical students was roughly 1.4 to 3.3 times tuition for undergraduate 
students, depending on institution type.  For institutions offering both bachelor’s and MD degrees, private 
universities charged on average a tuition of $18,235 in undergraduate programs and $25,655 in MD programs; 
public universities charged non-residents on average a tuition of $8,668 in undergraduate programs and $22,353 in 
MD programs; and public universities charged residents on average a tuition of $3,140 in undergraduate programs 
and $10,398 in MD programs.  Data for tuition and fees in MD programs are from the Association of American 
Medical Colleges and the corresponding undergraduate data are from the IPEDS survey. 
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funding for locating in a particular state, they would appear to appeal more to students who 
already have plans to locate in the state, either because of location preferences (e.g., wanting to 
be close to family) or because of occupational choice (e.g., the state has many jobs in chemical 
engineering).  To the extent this occurs, it would limit the program’s causal effect on the 
geographic distribution of college graduates.  Said another way, most of the money spent on 
these programs could go to people who would locate in the state anyway.  The size of a program 
could be an important factor in the balance between selection and causal effects, with the 
selection effect being larger in smaller programs.  Another factor in this regard could be whether 
aid is targeted to specific fields of study. 
6. Adjustments to the Composition of Enrollment in Public Universities 
Mix of In-State and Out-of-State Students 
The introduction of a broad-based merit-aid program usually leads to increased demand 
for college attendance in a state from resident students who are eligible for the scholarships.  The 
increased demand could be accommodated in at least three ways: (1) increasing overall 
enrollment in institutions in the state; (2) decreasing enrollment of resident students who do not 
qualify for the scholarships; and (3) decreasing enrollment of non-resident students.  These shifts 
could manifest themselves not only at the state level but also across institutions and across 
different types of institutions.9 
Suppose that a merit-aid program leads to a reduction in enrollment of non-resident 
students.  Would this change lead to an increase in the number of college graduates in the state’s 
workforce?  Many policymakers believe that it would, because out-of-state students are less 
likely than in-state students to locate in the state after college.  However, out-of-state students are 
                                                          
9 For example, the introduction of merit-aid programs in Georgia and New Mexico caused a shift in enrollment from 
two-year to four-year institutions because the programs reduced the tuition differential between these types of 
institutions (Cornwell et al. 2006; Binder and Ganderton 2002). 
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relevant for retention because attending college in a state can encourage these students to 
permanently relocate to the state.  Groen (2004) estimates that non-residents’ probability of 
locating in a state 10–15 years after college is increased by 6 to 10 percentage points as a result 
of going to college there.  For the College and Beyond database, the estimated effect is 0.06 
(0.11–0.05).  For the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, the 
estimated effect is 0.10 (0.15–0.05).10 
The mix of in-state students and out-of-state students can be affected by admission 
standards (Groen and White 2004) and by tuition levels (Ehrenberg and Rizzo 2004; Zhang 
2007).11  Groen and White (2004) focus on the divergence of interest between public universities 
and state governments concerning minimum admissions standards for in-state versus out-of-state 
applicants at selective public universities.  In their model, universities’ goal is to maximize 
average student ability, but states would like to maximize the present value of future state tax 
revenues.12  If universities are free to follow their own interests, then they are predicted to set 
equal standards for both groups.  By contrast, states would like their universities to set standards 
such that the additional expected future state tax revenue from the marginal student admitted is 
the same for in-state and out-of-state students.  (Marginal students are those just above the 
minimum standard required for admission.) 
As a result, the state’s preferred mix of in-state students and out-of-state students depends 
on how attending college in a state affects marginal students’ probability of working in that state.  
                                                          
10 Groen (2004), Tables 4 and 5. 
11 Though non-resident tuition is typically much higher than resident tuition, the differential between these two 
charges is smaller at universities that participate in tuition reciprocity agreements.  One type of reciprocity 
agreement is a bilateral agreement that is negotiated between two states; an example of this type is the agreement 
between Minnesota and Wisconsin, which goes back to 1968 (DesJardins 1999).  Another type is consortium 
agreements, in which a number of states in a geographic region are treated similarly under the agreement; an 
example is the Academic Common Market, which is administered by the Southern Regional Education Board and 
covers institutions in 16 states. 
12 They also consider that universities might set admission standards to maximize total revenue (from tuition and 
future donations from graduates), but the empirical evidence is not consistent with this objective. 
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Estimates from the College and Beyond database indicate that the size of this effect is similar for 
marginal in-state and out-of-state students.  For marginal in-state students, attending college in 
the state increases the probability of working in the state 20 years after college by 11 percentage 
points (from 0.34 to 0.45); the comparable increase for marginal out-of-state students is 10 
percentage points (from 0.04 to 0.14).13 
Groen and White (2004) found that, in practice, public universities set lower admission 
standards for in-state than out-of-state applicants, presumably in response to state pressure.  
However, they also found that favoring in-state applicants goes against states’ long-term 
financial interest.  With higher standards for out-of-state students, marginal out-of-state students 
have higher earnings and thus pay more in future state taxes.  Average lifetime state tax 
payments for marginal out-of-state students at public universities were $227,000, compared to 
only $185,000 for marginal in-state students.14  Since the location effects are similar for both sets 
of marginal students, the additional expected future state tax revenue is greater for marginal out-
of-state students than for marginal in-state students. 
Mix of Students by Field of Study 
States may also seek to influence the supply of college-educated labor by adjusting the 
composition of enrollment by field of study.  In their study of the growth of public higher 
education from 1890 to 1940, Goldin and Katz (1999) argue that a primary reason for state 
support to higher education during this period was to provide goods and services of value to 
citizens and local industrial interests.  One of these goods and services was training in fields in 
which the state’s economy was specialized.  In states having a concentration of economic 
activity in a particular industries (or products), the public sector often invested heavily in training 
                                                          
13 Groen and White (2004), Table 2. 
14 Groen and White (2004), Table 3. 
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and research in these industries.  For example, Wisconsin subsidized work on dairy products, 
North Carolina on tobacco, and Colorado on mining.  Since public universities provided training 
in fields that their states specialized in, graduates tended to remain in the state; this allowed 
states to capture the benefits of their investments.  Consistent with this argument, Goldin and 
Katz find that the shares of employment in mining, manufacturing, and agriculture are positively 
related to state support for higher education over this period. 
As state economies have become more diversified over time, the rationale for states to 
target particular industries in their funding of higher education has presumably become less 
important.  Though there are still some regional specializations (e.g., forestry in Michigan), most 
universities offer training in a wide range of subjects.  Still, targeting specific industries is in line 
with the finding that the elasticity of demand for college-educated labor is greater for degree 
types more likely to be employed in the production of traded goods (Bound et al. 2004).  If a 
state were to shift the composition of degrees awarded by its universities towards degree types 
employed in the traded-good sector, then the relative stock of college-educated labor would be 
more responsive to changes in the relative flow of bachelor’s degrees. 
As another motivation for state funding in the twenty-first century, states might invest 
heavily in a field in an attempt to become a dominant location in an emerging industry.  
Consider, for instance, the desire to be the next Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1996) or a leading 
center for the biotechnology industry (Dewan 2009).  Of course, if there are large benefits to be 
gained by establishing a state as the center of the “next big thing” then states would likely 
compete for that opportunity.  That competition would in turn lead to tax incentives and other 
subsidies, which would drive down the net benefits to the state that won the competition. 
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7. Other Retention and Recruitment Policies 
Many states have promoted internships for college students as a vehicle for encouraging 
graduates of colleges in their states to remain in the state after graduation.  In these programs, 
states function as intermediaries between students seeking internships and employers seeking 
interns.  The economic logic for such programs is internships will engage students with state-
based employers and promote the development of location-specific human capital that will 
encourage them to stay in the state after graduation. 
For example, Pennsylvania’s SciTech Scholarship includes an internship component with 
a location-contingent scholarship (National Governors Association 2000).  The scholarship 
provides up to $3,000 per year for Pennsylvania residents to pursue a bachelor’s degree in an 
approved science and technology field at a Pennsylvania institution.  Students must complete an 
internship with a Pennsylvania company, and after graduation must work in Pennsylvania one 
year for each year of scholarship assistance.  If these requirements are not met, the scholarship 
converts to a loan. 
Apart from this particular scholarship, Pennsylvania is promoting internships as part of 
its “Stay Invent the Future” initiative that is designed to reverse the net outward migration of 
college graduates from the state (Wirtz 2003).  In other respects this initiative is a marketing 
campaign that promotes Pennsylvania as a great place to live, work, and play.  Related initiatives 
in other states seek to appeal to those who had previously lived in the state.  For instance, in 
1998 the state of Michigan mailed recruitment letters to engineering graduates who had left the 
state (Durbin 2000). 
Other state programs go beyond providing information and promoting the state’s image.  
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont all have formal programs that augment marketing 
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efforts with job-search assistance by matching participants with job openings from state-based 
employers (Dougherty 2007).  These programs target those with ties to the state to return to the 
state. 
8. Concluding Thoughts 
This review has focused on state policies that target the supply side of the labor market.  
Of course, states use both demand-side and supply-side policies to promote economic 
development (Bartik 1991).  In applying the lessons from this review to an actual situation, it is 
important to consider what demand-side policies are in place.  As emphasized in Section 2, the 
level of demand for college-educated labor within a state is a crucial determinant of the number 
of college-educated workers in the state.  It is therefore natural for states to try to attract firms 
that are intensive in their use of college-educated labor. 
State policymakers often discuss the migration of college graduates with an exclusive 
focus on “brain drain”—the outward migration of college graduates who were either raised in the 
state or attended college in the state.  This group is important both for practical reasons (these 
graduates are good candidates to return) and for political reasons (their parents often still reside 
in the state).  However, from an economic perspective, a college graduate trained in another state 
is just as valuable as one trained locally.  Plainly, every state has some residents who were 
educated in other states; one state’s “brain drain” is another state’s “brain gain.”  Furthermore, 
the evolution of the stock of college-educated labor in a state depends on the net migration of 
college-educated workers (i.e., the difference between inflows and outflows).  Outflows are 
inevitable, but they can be compensated for by inflows. 
The mobility of college-educated labor appears to reduce incentives for states to invest in 
higher education.  However, affecting the concentration of college graduates is presumably only 
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one of many reasons why states might invest in higher education.  The private benefits of higher 
education are large and accrue to graduates wherever they choose to locate.  Furthermore, some 
of the social benefits to higher education do not depend on the location decisions of graduates.  
For instance, universities might promote economic growth through relationships between 
university research and local industry (Hill and Lendel 2007; Governor of New York 2009). 
In evaluating programs, it is wise to distinguish between beneficiaries whose behavior is 
affected by a program and those whose behavior is unaffected.  For example, what percentage of 
the awards from a state’s merit-aid program go to students who are diverted from out-of-state 
colleges, and how much goes to students who would have attended in-state colleges even in the 
absence of the program?  A lesson from the literature on the design and evaluation of public 
programs is that efficiency is improved by targeting subsidies to those whose behavior is most 
likely to be influenced by the subsidy (e.g., Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982).  In the context of the 
financial-aid programs considered here, targeting could be affected by the criteria used to 
determine eligibility—for example, the minimum GPA in high school required for a merit-aid 
program, or whether a state’s loan-repayment program is open to those who graduated from 
colleges in other states. 
Many analyses of higher-education policy consider one state in isolation and assume that 
policies in other states will not change.  However, in practice a policy change by one state is 
often followed by policy changes in other states (Besley and Case 1995), and these responses can 
alter the impact of the initial policy change.  This possibility is particularly relevant to the 
policies discussed here because students’ choice of college and graduates’ choice of work 
location both depend not just on their opportunities in any one state but on their relative 
opportunities in many states. 
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For instance, the spread of merit-aid policies throughout the Southeastern states amounts 
to a competition for high-ability students.  Georgia implemented its merit-aid program in 1993 
and witnessed an increase in the average ability of college freshmen in its public institutions 
(Cornwell et al. 2006).  But when neighboring states later enacted their own merit-aid programs, 
many high-ability students in these states chose to attend home-state colleges rather than Georgia 
colleges, which may have dissipated some of Georgia’s initial gains.  In the long run, the number 
of high-ability students attending college in a given state might be little different than the number 
before the wave of merit-aid plans.  Meanwhile, the changes might have worsened the matching 
of students to colleges because students selected their colleges based more on tuition than on 
other factors. 
 
  26
References 
 
Association of American Medical Colleges. 1998. AAMC Data Book: Statistical Information 
Related to Medical Education. Washington, DC: Association of American Medical Colleges.   
 
Association of American Medical Colleges. 2007. “Medical School Graduation and Attrition 
Rates.” Analysis in Brief. April. 
 
Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies? 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
 
Bauer, Paul W., Mark E. Schweitzer, and Scott Shane. 2008. “Knowledge Matters: The Long-
Run Determinants of State Income Growth.” Paper presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the 
Southern Economic Association, Washington, DC. 
 
Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 1995. “Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and 
Yardstick Competition.” American Economic Review 85: 25–45. 
 
Binder, Melissa, and Philip T. Ganderton. 2002. “Incentive Effects of New Mexico’s Merit-
Based State Scholarship Program: Who Responds and How?” in Donald E. Heller and Patricia 
Marin, eds., Who Should We Help? The Negative Social Consequences of Merit Scholarships. 
Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, 41–56. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Lawrence F. Katz. 1992. “Regional Evolutions.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1992: 1–75. 
 
Bound, John, Jeffrey Groen, Gabor Kezdi, and Sarah Turner. 2004. “Trade in University 
Training: Cross-State Variation in the Production and Stock of College-Educated Labor.” 
Journal of Econometrics 121: 143–173. 
 
Bound, John, and Harry J. Holzer. 2000. “Demand Shifts, Population Adjustments, and Labor 
Market Outcomes during the 1980s.” Journal of Labor Economics 18: 20–54. 
 
Cornwell, Christopher, David B. Mustard, and Deepa J. Sridhar. 2006. “The Enrollment Effects 
of Merit-Based Financial Aid: Evidence from Georgia’s HOPE Program.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 24: 761–786. 
 
DaVanzo, Julie S., and Peter A. Morrison. 1981. “Return and Other Sequences of Migration in 
the United States.” Demography 18: 85–101. 
 
DesJardins, Stephen L. 1999. “Simulating the Enrollment Effects of Changes in the Tuition 
Reciprocity Agreement between Minnesota and Wisconsin.” Research in Higher Education 40: 
705–716. 
 
Dewan, Shaila. 2009. “Despite Odds, Cities Race to Bet on Biotech.” New York Times, June 11, 
A1.  
  27
 
Dougherty, Conor. 2007. “Ex-Residents are Gone, but They’re Not Forgotten.” Wall Street 
Journal, December 26, B1. 
 
Durbin, Dee-Ann. 2000. “State Struggles with Loss of Grads.” Ann Arbor News, April 16, D5. 
 
Dynarski, Susan. 2000. “Hope for Whom? Financial Aid for the Middle Class and Its Impact on 
College Attendance.” National Tax Journal 53: 629–661. 
 
Dynarski, Susan. 2004. “The New Merit Aid,” in Caroline M. Hoxby, ed., College Choices: The 
Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 63–97. 
 
Dynarski, Susan. 2008. “Building the Stock of College-Educated Labor.” Journal of Human 
Resources 43: 576–610. 
 
Dynarski, Susan, and Judith E. Scott-Clayton. 2008. “Complexity and Targeting in Federal 
Student Aid: A Quantitative Analysis,” in James M. Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the Economy, 
Vol. 22. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 109–150. 
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. 2004. “Econometric Studies of Higher Education.” Journal of 
Econometrics 121: 19–37. 
 
Field, Erica. 2009. “Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid 
Experiment at NYU Law School.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1: 1–21.    
 
Glaeser, Edward L., Jose A. Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer. 1995. “Economic Growth in a 
Cross-Section of Cities. Journal of Monetary Economics 36: 117–143. 
 
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 1999. “The Shaping of Higher Education: The 
Formative Years in the United States, 1890 to 1940.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(1): 
37–62. 
 
Governor of New York. 2009. “Governor Paterson Issues Executive Order Creating Task Force 
to Diversify the New York State Economy Through Industry-Higher Education Partnerships.” 
Press Release on Executive Order No. 19, May 14. 
 
Groen, Jeffrey A. 2004. “The Effect of College Location on Migration of College-Educated 
Labor.” Journal of Econometrics 121: 125–142. 
 
Groen, Jeffrey A., and Michelle J. White. 2004. “In-State versus Out-of-State Students: The 
Divergence of Interest between Public Universities and State Governments.” Journal of Public 
Economics 88: 1793–1814. 
 
Hanson, Gordon H., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2002. Labor-Market Adjustment in Open 
Economies: Evidence from US States.” Journal of International Economics 57: 3–29. 
  28
 
Hill, Edward W., and Iryna Lendel. 2007. “The Impact of the Reputation of Bio-Life Science and 
Engineering Doctoral Programs on Regional Economic Development.” Economic Development 
Quarterly 21: 223–243. 
 
Hoxby, Caroline M. 1997. “How the Changing Market Structure of U.S. Higher Education 
Explains College Tuition.” Working Paper No. 6323. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
Indiana Fiscal Policy Institute. 2000. Survey of Current Practices in Postsecondary Graduate 
Retention. Indianapolis: Indiana Fiscal Policy Institute. 
 
Iranzo, Susana, and Giovanni Peri. 2009. “Schooling Externalities, Technology, and 
Productivity: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States.” Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 
420–431. 
 
Justman, Moshe and Jacques-Francois Thisse. 1997. “Implications of the Mobility of Skilled 
Labor for Local Public Funding of Higher Education.” Economics Letters 55: 409–412. 
 
Education Commission of the States. 2001. Merit Scholarships. ECS State Notes. Denver, CO: 
Education Commission of the States. July. 
 
Ledebur, Larry C., and Douglas Woodward. 1990. “Adding a Stick to the Carrot: Location 
Incentives with Clawbacks, Recisions, and Recalibrations.” Economic Development Quarterly 4: 
221–237. 
 
Long, Larry E. 1988. Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States. New York: 
Russell Sage. 
 
Moretti, Enrico. 2004. “Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education: Evidence from 
Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-sectional Data.” Journal of Econometrics 121: 175–212. 
 
Mullan, Fitzhugh. 1999. “The Muscular Samaritan: The National Health Service Corps in the 
New Century.” Health Affairs 18(2): 168–175. 
 
National Center for Education Statistics. 2002. Descriptive Summary of 1995–96 
Beginning Postsecondary Students: Six Years Later (NCES 2003-151). Washington, DC: 
National Center for Education Statistics. 
 
National Center for Education Statistics. 2004. The Condition of Education 2004 (NCES 2004-
077). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
National Center for Education Statistics. 2008. Digest of Education Statistics 2007 (NCES 2008-
022). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
  29
National Governors Association. 1998. “State Scholarship Programs to Assist and Retain 
Postsecondary Students.” Washington, DC: National Governors Association. 
 
National Governors Association. 2000. “Using Research and Development to Grow State 
Economies.” Washington, DC: National Governors Association. 
 
New York Times. 2001. “Iowa: Governor Wants Graduates to Stay Home.” New York Times, 
October 11, A20. 
 
Nichols, Albert L., and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 1982. “Targeting Transfers through Restrictions 
on Recipients.” American Economic Review 72(2): 372–377. 
 
Pathman, Donald E., Donald H. Taylor Jr., Thomas R. Konrad, Tonya S. King, Tyndall Harris, 
Tim M. Henderson, James D. Bernstein, Thomas Tucker, Kathleen D. Crook, Cora Spaulding, 
and Gary G. Koch. 2000. “State Scholarship, Loan Forgiveness, and Related Programs: The 
Unheralded Safety Net.” Journal of the American Medical Association 284: 2084–2092. 
 
Peters, Alan H. 1993. “Clawbacks and the Administration of Economic Development Policy in 
the Midwest.” Economic Development Quarterly 7: 328–340. 
 
Rizzo, Michael J., and Ronald G. Ehrenberg. 2004. “Resident and Nonresident Tuition and 
Enrollment at Flagship State Universities.” In Caroline Hoxby, ed., College Choices: The 
Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 303–349. 
 
Saxenian, AnnaLee. 1996. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Schmidt, Peter. 1998. “More States Try to Stanch ‘Brain Drains,’ but Some Experts Question the 
Strategy.” Chronicle of Higher Education, February 20, A6. 
 
Thaler, Richard H. 1992. The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life. New 
York: Free Press. 
 
Tornatzky, Louis G., Denis O. Gray, Stephanie A. Tarant, and Cathy Zimmer. 2001. Who Will 
Stay and Who Will Leave? Individual, Institutional and State-Level Predictors of State Retention 
of Recent Science and Engineering Graduates. Research Triangle Park, NC: Southern 
Technology Council. 
 
Trostel, Philip A., and Todd M. Gabe. 2007. “Fiscal and Economic Effects of College 
Attainment.” School of Economics Staff Paper No. 566. Orono, ME: University of Maine. 
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2006. A Half-Century of Learning: Historical Statistics on 
Educational Attainment in the United States, 1940 to 2000 (Census 2000 Report PHC-T-41). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
 
  30
Wirtz, Ronald A. 2003. “Plugging the Brain Drain.” Fedgazette (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis). January. 
 
Wozniak, Abigail. 2006. “Why Are College Graduates More Responsive to Distant Labor 
Market Opportunities?” Unpublished Manuscript. University of Notre Dame. 
 
Zhang, Liang. 2007. “Nonresident Enrollment Demand in Public Higher Education: An Analysis 
at National, State, and Institutional Levels.” Review of Higher Education 31: 1–25. 
  31
Figure 1. Percentage of Residents Aged 25 Years and Older with a Bachelor’s Degree or Higher, 
by State, 2000. 
 
Source: 2000 Census of Population and Housing. 
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Figure 2. Supply and Demand for College-Educated Labor in a State 
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Figure 3. Stocks and Flows of Degrees Awarded Relative to Cohort Size, Bachelor’s Degrees 
and Medical Degrees, 1966–85 Degree Cohorts 
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